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Abstract 
Reasoners who adopt the perspective of another can increase the proportion of logically 
valid inferences they make (Thompson, Evans, & Handley, 2005).  A possible explanation 
is that shifting perspective promotes analytic reasoning. If this were the case, then shifting 
perspectives should also reduce the belief-bias effect. Furthermore, strong evidence 
should be preferred over weak evidence. To test this, 256 participants read twenty-four 
research descriptions that varied in evidence quality and degree of personal belief content. 
Participants indicated whether the data supported the researcher’s hypotheses. Belief bias 
was reduced when participants evaluated the data from the researcher’s perspective 
relative to their own. Evidence strength was an important determining factor in decision-
making and it was sensitive to perspective and individual differences.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Our objective was to investigate how individuals overcome their propensity to 
make belief based decisions. Optimally reasoners should evaluate evidence based on the 
strength of that evidence and not their personal beliefs about the evidence. Belief bias is 
the tendency to evaluate conclusions based on prior beliefs independent of the evidence 
supporting the conclusion (Torrens, Thompson & Cramer, 1999). Belief bias is a widely 
replicated phenomenon that is difficult to eliminate (Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 
1992; Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994). Past research that used instructions 
emphasizing logical necessity and the importance of ignoring personal beliefs was only 
marginally successful in reducing belief bias (Newstead et al., 1992; Evans et al., 1994) 
other research has found that reasoning performance was influenced by perspective 
change (Beatty & Thompson, 2007; Thompson, Evans & Handley, 2005). Individual 
differences, perspective taking and evidence quality were used in the current 
investigation of belief bias in scientific reasoning.  
1.1 Dual Process Theory 
 The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning is a generally acknowledged theoretical 
framework for explaining belief bias. Typically, the dual systems are described in the 
following way. Heuristic processing is quick, effortless, relies on gist based processing 
and often includes stereotypes. Analytic processing is slow, resource demanding and 
difficult to engage. Activities like hypothetical thinking require analytic processing. The 
output of heuristic processes is accepted as a default unless analytic processes intervene. 
Heuristic processes can produce belief bias by quickly producing examples that seem 
highly salient but are not normatively warranted (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008). 
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Such is the case when individuals buy lottery tickets with the expectation of winning. 
Lottery winners are far the more salient outcome as they appear on television and the 
news media whereas the thousands of individuals that lose are not equally salient. 
Individuals fail to account for the base rate of lottery winners to losers when purchasing 
tickets. Furthermore, individuals feel their tickets are luckier than those belonging to 
others in the lottery (Risen & Gilovich, 2007). The latest versions of dual process theory 
make it clear that the heuristic and analytic systems are made up of multiple components. 
It is necessary to have a third type of process that determines which of the heuristic or 
analytic processes gets to control the response (Evans, 2009; Thompson, 2009; 
Stanovich, 2009). 
Stanovich (2009) proposed a tri-process theory. Heuristic processes were renamed 
the autonomous set of systems (TASS) to represent that they were a heterogeneous set. 
TASS includes domain general products of implicit learning and conditioning as well as 
rules, stimulus discriminations and well practiced decision-making principles that have 
become automatic. TASS is autonomous in that it responds to stimuli and is not 
dependent upon input format nor is TASS controlled by the analytic processes. Despite 
the name change the form and function of TASS remains relatively unchanged, as it was 
the analytic processes where the greatest level of revision occurred. The analytic 
processes have been redefined as two levels of processing: The reflective level and the 
algorithmic level. The reflective level is responsible for the larger goal state, epistemic 
values, and critical thinking skills. The reflective mind is proposed to associate with 
preferences in thinking disposition. It is the reflective mind that is the new member of the 
dual process theory. Its role is to mediate the individual’s goal state into an action that 
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results in either using a TASS output or committing a TASS override. The algorithmic 
level refers to a traditional conceptualization of analytic thinking. It is associated with 
measures of intelligence and cognitive capacity it is this level that is responsible for 
overriding the TASS outputs but it itself is subordinate to the reflective level.  
In order to better understand the proposed reflective mind, and the hypothesis that 
it mediates analytic intervention, it is necessary to engender a conflict between the 
heuristic TASS output and the analytic (algorithmic level). One common method is to put 
beliefs in conflict with another dimension that is presumed to rely on analytic processes. 
In our case, it was the quality of the evidence participants were presented with. The 
measures of individual differences in thinking style, epistemology and decision making 
style provide an avenue of investigation into their proposed association with the reflective 
mind. The goal was to examine variables that affect the probability and quality of 
heuristic/TASS override. We made use of task manipulations that we proposed cued the 
need for analytic thinking, as well as individual differences in reflective thinking. 
1.2 Belief Bias  
Belief bias is easily replicated but its causes are not well understood. Individuals’ 
prior beliefs impact reasoning by influencing these same individuals to accept 
conclusions consistent with their prior beliefs and reject belief inconsistent conclusions. 
A biased decision is one that is independent of the supporting evidence quality. The 
available research suggests that belief bias is not linked to the efficiency of algorithmic 
processing, suggesting that we need to look at reflective processing as a way to explain 
intervention (West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008). 
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Klaczynski and Narasimbam (1998) found that scientific evidence that supported 
personal beliefs was rated as valid and stronger compared to belief challenging evidence. 
Participants could objectively evaluate scientific evidence but unequally applied their 
skills to belief consistent and inconsistent material. Klaczynski and Lavallee (2005) 
found that belief consistent arguments were more persuasive and considered valid more 
often than belief threatening arguments. It is clear that beliefs have an impact on the 
perception and evaluation of evidence and arguments. These effects are not consistent 
across participants and any mediating factors that can account for this variability should 
be explored.  
1.3 Individual Differences 
Belief bias is not strictly determined by differences in cognitive ability 
(Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008). Klaczynski and 
Gordon’s (1996) study of statistical reasoning in adolescents found that cognitive ability 
was not connected to biases in the adolescents’ reasoning. Individuals were better at 
critically evaluating belief inconsistent evidence compared to their evaluations of belief 
consistent evidence.  
A method for indexing reflective processes was required to explore the hypothesis 
that a predisposition to belief bias may be linked to these processes. As suggested by 
Stanovich (2009) measures of thinking dispositions is hypothesized to correlate with the 
reflective mind. Thinking style was defined here, as a tendency to think in a specific way 
(Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000). Thinking style must have some mechanism for how it 
impacts performance. It is best thought of as what an individual thinks is adequate to 
support their conclusion (Kuhn, 1991). Individuals differ in their level of motivation; 
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those who want to confirm their beliefs ought to respond differently than those who are 
open minded about material that conflicts with their beliefs. Thinking style measures can 
assess how people report they think and the value they place on changing one’s opinions 
to reflect available evidence. Most thinking disposition measures use self-reports, so it is 
beneficial to use multiple measures to look for reporting consistency. Thinking 
dispositions are not distinct categorical entities rather they are an inclination toward one 
pattern at the expense of another. Stanovich and colleagues (1997, 1998, 2007) 
investigate thinking styles using the Actively Open Minded Thinking questionnaire 
(AOT). The AOT quantifies the value an individual reports they place on active thinking, 
self-reflection, belief change, and alternate explanations. Thinking disposition has 
predicted the magnitude of belief bias in formal (Stanovich & West, 1997, 1998) and 
informal reasoning tasks (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Sa, Kelley, Ho, & Stanovich, 
2005). We should observe a relationship between measures of thinking dispositions and 
belief bias such that those individuals who are active open-minded thinkers should show 
less belief bias than those that do not report that type of thinking preference. Furthermore, 
these active open-minded thinkers should also correlate positively with indices of analytic 
thinking. There are a variety of approaches to define and measure thinking dispositions. 
Prior work has focused on only one at a time, but our goal was to adopt a more 
integrative view.  Below, a number of approaches are described from epistemology to 
cognitive patience.  
Everyone has a way they think about knowledge this is their individual 
epistemology. An individual’s epistemology can influence their reasoning performance 
(Kuhn, 1991). The evaluation of evidence is hypothesized to directly connect to an 
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individual’s belief in the certainty of knowledge. Kuhn (1991) proposed three types of 
epistemological theories. Absolutist epistemologies view knowledge as objective and 
subsequently positions are either right or wrong. Multiplist epistemologies view 
knowledge as subjective; therefore, one person cannot be more certain than another. 
Evaluative epistemologies view knowledge as subjective and that it can be objectively 
evaluated based on the supporting evidence. Kuhn, Cheney and Weinstock (2000) 
assessed an individual’s epistemological understanding across five dimensions: personal 
taste, aesthetics, values, truth about the social world, and truth about the physical world. 
Scraw, Dunkle and Bendixen (1995) also have a measure that assesses an individual’s 
beliefs on five subscales: simple knowledge, certain knowledge, innate ability, 
omniscient authority and quick learning. We should observe a relationship between 
measures of epistemology and belief bias such that those individuals who have more 
complex epistemologies should show less belief bias than those that report less complex 
epistemological views. Moreover, those with complex epistemological views should also 
correlate positively with indices of analytic thinking. 
The cognitive reflections test (CRT) by Frederick (2005) is thought to measure 
cognitive patience along with the general decision making scale (GDMS) by Scott and 
Bruce (1995) both provide avenues of investigation. We should observe a relationship 
between the performance-based measure of cognitive patience and belief bias such that 
those individuals who have more cognitive patience should show less belief bias than 
those who are not patient. Additionally, there should be a positive correlation between 
cognitive patience and indices of analytic thinking. The GDMS subscales may correlate 
with belief bias such that those individuals who have more impulsive decision making 
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style should show more belief bias than those that report more deliberate decision making 
styles. Those subscales may correlate with our indices of analytic thinking. These 
measures of epistemology, decision-making, and cognitive patience are novel inclusions 
that provide fresh areas of investigation of individual differences in reasoning. Thus, they 
may provide additional measures to index the reflective mind.  
1.4 Scientific Reasoning and Perspective   
Belief bias is a notoriously robust phenomenon that is difficult to eliminate, even 
by instruction (Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992; Evans, Newstead, Allen, & 
Pollard, 1994). A small number of studies have found that manipulations of decision 
perspective have been effective in reducing belief bias (Greenhoot, Semb, Colombo & 
Schreiber, 2004; Beatty & Thompson, 2007; Thompson, Evans & Handley, 2005). It is 
hypothesized that the perspective manipulation moderated belief bias by increasing the 
amount of analytic processing the participant conducted.  
Greenhoot, Semb, Colombo and Schreiber (2004) presented participants with the 
method and results of hypothetical experiments and then asked them to make judgments 
about belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent cause and effect relationships. In a within-
subjects design participants were asked to make causal conclusions from two 
perspectives, their own and that of the researcher. The conclusion options were either 
consistent or inconsistent with the students’ beliefs. Most students made accurate 
predictions about the belief consistent problem but less than a quarter of the participants 
made accurate predictions about the belief inconsistent problem. Participants were more 
accurate on the belief inconsistent problem from the researcher’s perspective than when 
they made the conclusion from their own perspective. However, there were limitations to 
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this study. The belief condition was confounded with the study outcome. The belief 
consistent problem had evidence that supported a positive correlation whereas the belief 
inconsistent problem had evidence that supported a null relationship. 
Research by Thompson, Evans and Handley (2005) found effects related to 
decision perspective comparable to Greenhoot et al.’s (2004) using a between subjects 
design. In a conditional argument task individuals accepted more inferences from the 
writer’s perspective than from their own perspective. Thompson et al. interpreted this 
finding as individuals were more likely to accept the truth of the premise from the 
writer’s perspective than from their own which could lead to analytic, decontexualized 
reasoning. Importantly, acceptance rates by inference validity was only significant for the 
group that responded from the writer’s perspective and not for the group who responded 
from their own perspective. Reasoning from one’s own perspective may promote 
contextualized processes that make use of past experience independent of the value that 
past experience has in the current context. Reasoning from another’s perspective may 
reduce belief bias.  
Beatty and Thompson (2007) used a scientific reasoning task that combined 
manipulations of belief and perspective. Individuals evaluated two belief-consistent and 
two belief-inconsistent vignettes. Each vignette described a research hypothesis, method 
and result. Participants made one conclusion from their own perspective and one from the 
researcher’s perspective. Beatty and Thompson found that individuals were less biased 
when evaluating research vignettes from the researcher’s perspective. They also found 
that high scores on the Actively Open Minded Thinking scale were correlated with the 
ability to identify flaws in the evidence, but not with belief bias. While this study 
  
9 
disentangled belief from the evidence conclusion relationship present in Greenhoot et 
al.’s (2004), it too had its limitations. Participants were very likely to choose a conclusion 
that supported the hypothesis in the vignette this was a disconcerting result, given the 
poor quality evidence presented in all conditions. Therefore, the reduction in belief bias 
might be a bias to accept the available conclusion independent of personal beliefs rather 
than a reduction in bias due to increase analytic processing.  
The results of Thompson et al. provide supporting evidence that changing 
decision perspective increases analytic processing as inference validity was only 
significant from the writers perspective in their study. Given that the scientific evaluation 
task of Beatty and Thompson (2007) was substantively different from conditional 
arguments, a performance comparison that includes an evidence quality manipulation 
would improve the specificity of the conclusion that can be drawn from the results. 
1.5 The Current Study  
 The purpose of the current study was to investigate variables that underlie 
propensity to override a heuristic TASS response and intervene with analytic response in 
a scientific evaluation task. Individual differences in thinking style, epistemology and 
decision making style were used to explore their relationship with belief bias in a 
scientific reasoning task. The proposed mechanism for the interface between thinking 
style and reasoning performance was the proficiency that individuals engage in analytic 
processing. Specifically, that analytic processing was more likely to result in accurate 
evaluations of reasoning stimuli as compared to heuristic processing. 
 In the current experiment participants evaluated 24 experiment scenarios that had 
a range of possible degrees of prior beliefs. Stimuli were developed expressly so that 
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some items would be highly belief consistent or belief inconsistent while others would be 
neutral. As with Beatty and Thompson’s previous work participants made two 
conclusions, one from the perspective of the researcher and one from their own 
perspective. Furthermore, individual differences in AOT, CRT, GDMS, and two 
measures of epistemological understanding provided indices of the reflective mind, and 
algorithmic processing was indexed by the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (SILS) 
(Zachary, 1991) as proposed in Stanovich (2009). Based on the previous literature review 
there are multiple predictions being made.  
Hypothesis one was that the perspective manipulation increases the amount of 
analytic processing the participant conducts thereby moderating belief bias. There should 
be less belief bias and greater reliance on evidence quality from the researcher’s as 
opposed to the participant’s perspective. Additionally, experiments supported by strong 
evidence should be endorsed at higher rates than those experiments supported by weak 
evidence. 
Hypothesis two was that the epistemological measures index the reflective mind 
and therefore, should be associated with the predisposition to engage analytic thinking. 
Thus, they should be correlated with both belief bias and reliance on evidence quality. 
Hypothesis three was that if the individual differences tests measure similar 
constructs then they should correlate with each other and with similar performance 
dependent variables. Conversely, if these different measures are not correlated there are 
two possible interpretations, either they represent independent constructs or they do not 
represent characteristics that have a relationship with the reasoning process. 
2. Method 
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2.1 Participants  
There were two groups of participants. One group was recruited from the 
University of Saskatchewan community including staff and students using posters and 
website advertisements. Participants were compensated at a rate of $5.00 per half hour of 
participation. There were 77 participants (34 men and 42 women) with a mean age of 
22.13 years (SD = 5.25). Participants had an average of 15.24 years (SD = 2.30) of formal 
education. We asked participants to report the highest level of education achieved: 26.3% 
had completed high school, 1.3% had technical training beyond high school, and 51.3% 
had college or some university, 18.4% had an undergraduate degree, and 2.6% had a 
graduate degree. Seventy-six participants indicated English as their preferred language 
and one participant did not report language preference.  
The second group of participants consisted of 179 individuals (35 men and 143 
women, one did not report) with a mean age of 29.05 years (SD = 11.65). These 
participants were recruited online through advertisements on research sites and online 
classified sites. Participants had an average of 16.35 years (SD = 3.00) of formal 
education. We asked participants to report the highest level of education achieved: 0.6% 
had completed some high school, 9.0% had completed high school, 13.9% had technical 
training beyond high school, 37.1% had college or some university, 31.3% had an 
undergraduate degree, and 18.0% had a graduate degree. One hundred and seventy-five 
participants indicated English as their preferred language, one reported German English 
bilingualism, one reported Spanish and one did not report. Those participants who 
completed the study online did the exact same task as those who completed it in the lab 
with one exception; they did not complete the Shipley Institute of Living scale as the 
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cognitive ability measure was not licensed for online use nor was it feasible to do so due 
to its administration procedure.  
2.2 Materials 
2.2.1 Experiment evaluation task. The experiment evaluation task consisted of 
three parts; which will be described individually. The first part was the pretest, which was 
followed by the evaluation task and then the experiment evaluation short answer 
questions. 
2.2.2  Pretest. The purpose of the pretest was to assess the participant’s personal 
beliefs on the topics they would later evaluate in the experiment evaluation task. 
Participants indicated their agreement or disagreement with 24 statements on a seven 
point scale: 1 (Strongly Disagree) 2 (Disagree) 3 (Disagree Slightly) 4 (Neither Agree nor 
Disagree) 5 (Agree Slightly) 6 (Agree) 7 (Strongly Agree). The items referred to social 
issues such as criminal behavior and child education (e.g., students who enjoy school are 
more likely to succeed academically than students who do not enjoy school). Four items 
were taken from Stanovich and West (1997), two from Greenhoot et al. (2004) and the 
remaining eighteen were developed for the current experiment. These items represent the 
hypotheses for the experiments participants later evaluated. 
2.2.3 Experiment evaluation. Participants evaluated twenty-four experimental 
scenarios. Each experiment scenario contained: a description of the researcher, a 
hypothesis, a piece of evidence, and four conclusions. For example: 
Dr. Kennedy, a psychologist, wanted to investigate school success. He used a 
questionnaire to evaluate students’ academic experiences in high school. Dr. 
Kennedy hypothesized that students who enjoyed school would be more likely to 
succeed academically. Dr. Kennedy found that in Saskatoon, 90% of those students 
who enjoyed school graduated, whereas national statistics show that only 10% of 
those who did not enjoy school graduated. 
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What should Dr. Kennedy conclude based on the evidence provided here?  
A) High school students who enjoy school are more successful than those who do 
not enjoy school. 
B) High school students who enjoy school are less successful than those who do not 
enjoy school. 
C) There is no relationship between high school students’ enjoyment of school and 
their school success. 
D) No conclusions are warranted. 
 
What would you conclude based on the evidence provided here? 
A) High school students who enjoy school are more successful than those who do 
not enjoy school. 
B) High school students who enjoy school are less successful than those who do not 
enjoy school. 
C) There is no relationship between high school students’ enjoyment of school and 
their school success. 
D) No conclusions are warranted. 
 
Participants evaluated each of the four conclusions from their own and the researcher’s 
perspective. The perspective that the evaluation was made from was randomly assigned. 
These four conclusions described a different possible relationship between the two 
variables described in the vignette. In half the scenarios, the researcher was of high 
authority and was low for the other half. The assignment of evidence type to authority 
and evidence quality conditions was randomly assigned. 
Half of the experiments presented poor quality evidence and half better quality 
evidence. Four types of evidence were presented to increase the perceived validity of the 
experiments and therefore retain the participant’s experimental interest. Each type had a 
strong and weak version. Statistical evidence described the degree of correlation between 
two variables. In the weak version of this evidence only one direction of the relationship 
was described whereas the strong evidence version described both directions of the 
relationship (e.g. Strong: statistics from the current study show that when the number of 
students that enjoyed school increased, graduation rates increased; conversely, when the 
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number of students that enjoyed school decreased, so did the graduation rates. Weak: 
statistics from the current study show that when the number of students that enjoyed 
school increased, graduation rates increased.) 
  A second type of evidence included information about the co-occurrence of cause 
and effect with either a large sample (n > 96) and thereby strong piece of evidence or a 
small sample (n < 8) thereby weak piece of evidence (e.g., Strong: of the 110 people who 
were sampled, all 55 of the students that enjoyed school graduated, but 0 of the 55 
students that did not enjoy school graduated). A third type of evidence provided 
information about the co-occurrence of cause and effect. The strong version of the 
evidence included the converse probability whereas the weak version confounded the 
comparison with two different samples (e.g., Strong: 90% of those students who enjoyed 
school in Saskatoon graduated, whereas only 10% of those students in Saskatoon who did 
not enjoy school graduated. Weak: in Saskatoon, 90% of those students who enjoyed 
school graduated, whereas national statistics show that only 10% of those who did not 
enjoy school graduated). The final evidence type was a survey in which a large group 
from the population was surveyed. In the strong evidence version the group sampled was 
from the population the conclusions were generalized to and the evidence contained no 
explicit confounds. In the weak version of this evidence type the sample was restricted to 
a small subset of the total population to which the conclusion was generalized and it was 
confounded by geography, socioeconomic status etc. (e.g., Strong: In a province wide 
survey, those students that enjoy school graduated at higher rates than students that did 
not enjoy school. Weak: In a province wide survey of grade nine students, those students 
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that enjoyed school graduated from large schools at higher rates than students from small 
schools that did not enjoy school). 
Participants chose one of four conclusion options for each experiment scenario. 
The first asserted a positive relationship between two variables, the second a negative 
relationship, the third a null relationship and the fourth asserted that no conclusions were 
warranted. The first option supported the researcher’s hypothesis, whereas options two 
and three contradicted the hypothesis. The first was considered correct for the scenarios 
with strong evidence presented and the fourth was considered correct for the scenarios 
that had weak evidence.  
2.2.4 Experiment evaluation short answer questions. Participants were asked a 
series of short questions requiring either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response or a short written 
response. The questions were related to the authority, evidence strength and perspective 
manipulations. For example; participants were asked, “Did you notice anything about the 
evidence quality?” (Yes/No) and “Did the evidence provided effect your decisions?” 
(Yes/No). Several other questions pertaining to authority and perspective were included. 
The purpose of these questions was to get some self report data as to what the participants 
were doing during the task. 
2.3 Individual Differences Measures 
2.3.1 Actively open-minded thinking scale (AOT). The AOT measures self 
reported tendency to engage active, flexible, hypothetical thinking (Stanovich & West, 
2007; Stanovich & West, 1997; Sá, Stanovich & West, 1999). Participants indicated their 
agreement on a six-point scale on items such as “No one can talk me out of something I 
know is right” and “If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it.” 
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thirty of the items are reverse scored. Scores were obtained by totaling the responses to 
all 41 statements.  
2.3.2 Cognitive reflections test (CRT). The CRT is a three-item measure that is 
thought to assess cognitive patience (Frederick, 2005). Each question prompts a 
heuristically motivated response; however, this answer is incorrect. In order to be 
successful an individual must suppress that initial heuristically produced response and 
derive a response based on further analyses. One example item is: A bat and a ball cost 
$1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ___ cents. 
Usually the initial response is that the ball must cost 10 cents, but that is incorrect.  
2.3.3 Epistemological belief inventory (EBI). The EBI is a 28 item scale assessing 
an individual’s beliefs on five subscales: simple knowledge (seven items; e.g. Most 
things worth knowing are easy to understand), certain knowledge (five items; e.g. What is 
true is a matter of opinion), innate ability (six items; e.g. Really smart students don't have 
to work as hard to do well in school), omniscient authority (five items; e.g. People 
shouldn’t question authority) and quick learning (five items; e.g. Working on a problem 
with no quick solution is a waste of time). Five items were reverse scored. Participants 
indicated their level of agreement with a series of statements on a six-point scale from 
Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Slightly Disagree (3), Slightly Agree (4), Agree (5), 
Strongly Agree (6). Scores on each of the subscales were obtained by calculating the 
mean score on each of the subscales. High scores indicate naïve views, like a belief in 
certain knowledge and low scores indicate individuals who reject such a position 
(Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995).  
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2.3.4 General decision making style (GDMS). The GDMS scale consists of 25 
statements that assess how individuals make important decisions. Participants are asked 
to indicated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a five 
point scale: Strongly Disagree (1), Somewhat Disagree (2), Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
(3), Somewhat Agree (4), Strongly Agree (5). The questionnaire has five items for each 
of the five subscales. Rational style is characterized by a search for logical alternatives 
and evaluations (e.g. I plan my important decisions carefully). Intuitive style is one that 
uses feelings and hunches (e.g. When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts). 
Dependant style relies on advice and direction from others (e.g. I often need the 
assistance of other people when making important decisions). Avoidant style is one that 
tries to evade the decision (e.g. I postpone decision making whenever possible). Finally, 
the spontaneous style attempts to complete the decision as quickly as possible (e.g. I 
generally make snap decisions). Scores were obtained by calculating the mean response 
on each of the subscales and an overall style was calculated by determining the highest 
score of each of the subscales (Scott & Bruce, 1995).  
2.3.5 Epistemological understanding assessment (EUA). The EUA assess an 
individual’s beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Participants are classified into three 
groups based on their responses to four sets of questions. For example:  
Robin says the stew is spicy. 
Chris says the stew is not spicy at all. 
 
Can only one of their views be right, or could both have some rightness?  
Only one right  Both could have some rightness 
 
If both could be right: 
Could one view be better or more right than the other?  
One could be more right than the other  
One could not be more right that the other 
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The three groups are: Absolutist, multiplist, and evaluative (Kuhn, Cheney & Weinstock, 
2000). The response “only one right” indicates an absolutist thinking style. The response 
“One could not be more right that the other” implies a multiplist thinking style. 
Evaluative thinkers endorse “both could have some rightness” and that “one could be 
more right than the other.”  Participants were evaluated on five dimensions: Judgments of 
personal taste (Robin says warm summer days are nicest. Chris says cool autumn days are 
nicest.), aesthetic judgments (Robin thinks the first painting they look at is better. Chris 
thinks the second painting they look at is better.), value judgments (Robin thinks lying is 
wrong. Chris thinks lying is permissible in certain situations.), judgments of truth about 
the social world (Robin has one view of why criminals keep going back to crime. Chris 
has a different view of why criminals keep going back to crime.), judgments of truth 
about the physical world (Robin believes one book's explanation of what atoms are made 
up of. Chris believes another book's explanation of what atoms are made up of.).  
As Kuhn, Cheney and Weinstock (2002) specified, participants were assigned to 
the categories of absolutist, multiplist, or evaluative for a specific judgment type when 
they answered a minimum of two of the three items the same. For example, if a 
participant endorsed the “only one right” for two of the three items in the values 
judgment dimension they would be classified as an absolutist on that dimension. The total 
number of times across all dimensions an individual gave absolutist, multiplist or 
evalulativist answer was added and a total value was obtained. 
2.3.6 Shipley institute of living scale (SILS). The SILS is self-administered and 
consists of two subtests: The vocabulary subtest and the abstraction subtest (Zachary, 
1991). The vocabulary subtest consists of 40 multiple-choice questions in which the 
  
19 
individual is asked to choose which of four words is most similar in meaning to a target 
word. Administration time for the subtest is 10 minutes. The abstraction subtest consists 
of 20 questions in which sequences of numbers, letters, or words with the final element in 
each sequence omitted. The individual is required to complete each of the sequences. 
Administration time for each of the subtests is 10 minutes and the SILS provides a valid 
alternative to more intensive IQ measurements. It has been highly correlated with the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Revised, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III, and 
the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test. (Bowers & Pantel, 1985; Zachary, Crumpton & 
Speigal, 1985; Weiss & Schell, 1991). The SILS exhibits good internal consistency, test-
retest validity, and criterion-related validity (Bowers & Pantel, 1985; Zachary, Crumpton 
& Speigal, 1985; Weiss & Schell, 1991). 
2.4 Procedure 
Testing occurred in one session in the following order. Participants completed the 
Shipley Institute of Living Scale, demographics, pretest, experiment evaluation task, 
experiment evaluation short answer questions, Actively open minded thinking scale, 
Cognitive reflections test, Epistemological Beliefs Inventory, Epistemological 
Understanding Assessment, and the General Decision Making Style questionnaire. 
Research scenarios were randomly ordered. Participants were tested individually and in 
small groups. The experiment took approximately sixty minutes to complete.  
Those participants who completed the study online completed the same measures 
with the exception that they did not complete the Shipley Institute of Living Scale. When 
the participants viewed an advertisement for the study on the internet, they were directed 
to the study webpage where they read and completed the standard consent procedures.  
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3. Results 
The design of this experiment was quite complex involving many manipulated 
factors as well as measures of individual differences. As such, the analyses were broken 
into three sections. First, an ANOVA of scientific evaluation task was conducted. 
Second, a regression analysis of belief in the scientific evaluation task is reported. Belief 
was not included in the ANOVA as it was measured continuously. Finally, the analyses 
of individual differences and their relationship with performance on the scientific 
evaluation task were conducted. 
3.1 Experiment Evaluation Task ANOVA 
The factors of perspective, authority, and evidence quality were entered into a 
2x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA. The dependant variable was conclusion acceptance, 
meaning the rate that participants endorsed the conclusion option that supported the 
researcher’s hypothesis. There was a main effect of perspective such that participants 
were more likely to endorse a conclusion that supports the researcher’s hypothesis from 
the researcher’s perspective (66.0%) compared to their own perspective (60.6%), F(1, 
255)=31.75, MSE=.05, p<.001. There was a main effect of evidence strength such that 
strong evidence (70.7%) was supported more often than weak evidence (55.9%), F(1, 
255)=139.20, MSE=.08, p<.001. This result supported the Hypothesis One, which was 
that strong evidence would be endorsed at higher rates than weak evidence. There was a 
perspective by evidence strength interaction, F(1, 255)=5.36, MSE=.01, p<.05. The 
difference in acceptance rates between strong and weak evidence is greater from the 
researcher’s perspective than the participant’s perspective (See Figure 1). The perspective 
by evidence strength interaction supported the previous interpretation by Beatty and 
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Thompson (2007) and our current contention that asking participants to reason from 
another’s perspective promotes analytic processes and greater reliance on evidence 
quality in the researcher’s as opposed to the participant’s perspective. The increased level 
of discrimination between evidence qualities from the researcher’s perspective could be 
due to increased use of those analytic processes. There was no main effect of authority; 
participants were equally likely to support the researcher’s hypothesis if the researcher 
was described as a psychologist (63.1%) or if they were described as a student (63.6%), 
F(1, 255)=0.19, MSE=.07, p>.05. No other interactions were significant.  
 
Figure 1. Perspective by evidence strength ANOVA interaction. Jarmasz and Hollands 
(2009) confidence intervals are reported. 
3.2 Regression Analyses of Belief 
The dimension of belief was assessed continuously by participant, as a result of 
this method of measurement belief could not be included in the ANOVA analyses and 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Researcher Participant
R
at
e 
of
 c
on
cl
us
io
n 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 (%
) 
Decision Perspective
Strong
Weak
  
22 
was best evaluated within a regression model. We wanted to independently assess the 
effects of belief and the anticipated belief by perspective interaction for each participant’s 
decisions; therefore, in accordance with Stanovich and West’s (1997) analysis strategy 
two regressions were conducted for each participant for a total of 502 individual 
regressions. Two regressions were conducted for each person: One for the responses from 
the researcher’s perspective and one for the responses from the participants’ perspective. 
These were conducted in this manner so the effect of personal belief could be isolated by 
decision perspective. The independent variables of pretest belief ratings, authority level 
and evidence quality were entered into the regression equation simultaneously. Therefore, 
the regression coefficients for each independent variable were calculated controlling for 
all the other independent variables. The dependent variable for each regression was 
conclusion acceptance rates from each perspective. These analyses resulted in two beta 
weights for belief from the participant’s and researcher’s perspective. This belief beta 
weight was indicative of the degree of reliance on personal beliefs independent of 
evidence quality and experimenter authority. The mean belief beta weight from the 
researcher’s perspective was .043 (SD =.213) and the mean beta weight from the 
participant’s perspective was .095. (SD =.242). Although both of these values are small 
they were both significantly different from zero, t(235) = 3.08, SE=.01, p<.01; t(240) = 
6.07, SE=.02, p<.001 respectively. Furthermore, they are significantly different from each 
other (t(232) = -4.23, p<.001). There was a great deal of variability in the regression beta 
weight values for individual’s reliance on belief. These results nonetheless support 
hypothesis one that the perspective manipulation increases the amount of analytic 
processing the participant conducts thereby moderating belief bias in the conclusions.  
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3.3 Experiment Evaluation Short Answer Questions 
We asked participants a series of questions about the experiment evaluation task 
after they had completed the 24 problems. When participants were asked: Did you notice 
that some of the experimenter’s were doctors and others were students or journalists? 
(Yes/No) 86.5% of participants indicated ‘yes’ they had noticed. When participants were 
asked: Did that matter to you when you were making your decisions? (Yes/No) 94.7% of 
participants said no it did not matter. This last response pattern is consistent with the 
ANOVA analyses as variable of authority was not significant. When participants were 
asked: Did you notice anything about the evidence quality? (Yes/No) 86.1% of 
participants indicated ‘yes’ they had noticed. When participants were asked: Did the 
evidence provided affect your decisions? (Yes/No) 82.6% of participants ‘yes’ it did 
impact their decisions. This is consistent with the ANOVA findings of a main effect for 
evidence strength. To further investigate the perspective manipulation we then asked 
participants two general questions about their decision making process: When asked to 
decide from the experimenter’s perspective what did you do? and when asked to decide 
from your perspective what did you do? These two questions were intended to get a 
general idea of what the participants could report about their performance. The 
participants written responses were coded to evaluate participants’ use of the presented 
evidence. Responses were assigned a score ranging from 0 to 4.  A response was given 
the code 4 if it contained reference to testing the researcher's hypothesis, evaluating the 
evidence, looking at the statistics, or logic. Code 3 was given if the response contained 
reference to any of the qualities of code 4 but also mentioned the use of personal beliefs. 
A response was given the code 2 if it only mentioned using personal beliefs, personal 
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background knowledge, opinions and gut feelings. Code 1 was used in a particular case 
where participants indicated that they pretended they were the researcher for example 
“put myself in their situation” or “used my own perspective as if I was the experimenter”. 
Zero was coded if a response did not fit into these categories (e.g., incomplete statements, 
unintelligible responses, etc.). See Figure 2 for the complete coding results. Participants 
were more likely to report an evidence based (code 4) response for the researcher’s 
perspective (70.0%) compared to their own perspective (58.9%), t(206) = 2.77, p =.006. 
Participants were more likely to report using some form of personal beliefs (code 3) from 
their perspective (13.4%) compared to the researcher's perspective (0%), t(206) = -5.68, p 
<.001. Additionally, they were more likely to report only using personal beliefs (code 2) 
from their own perspective (12.0%) compared to the researcher’s perspective (2.4%), 
t(206) = -4.07, p <.001. Overall, participants reported more evidence base response 
patterns from the researcher’s perspective and they reported more instances of using 
personal belief from their perspective. These results mirror the regression findings of 
greater belief effects from the participant’s perspective and they also mirror the evidence 
by perspective interaction from the ANOVA.    
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Figure 2. Experiment evaluation written response coding results. 
Individual Differences 
Participants completed a number of individual differences measures. The mean 
scores of these measures can be found in Table 1. These measures of individual 
difference were correlated with the standardized beta weights for belief, authority and 
evidence from each perspective (See Table 2). This analysis strategy was implemented to 
determine if any of these individual differences was related to the use of personal beliefs, 
reliance on authority, and sensitivity to evidence quality. These analyses directly relate to 
Hypothesis Two, that the epistemological measures index the reflective mind and 
therefore, should be associated with the predisposition to engage analytic thinking. Thus, 
they should be correlated with both belief bias and reliance on evidence quality.   
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Table 1  
Individual difference measure means. 
Measure Mean SD 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
AOT 181.56 20.01 0.87 
CRT 50.19 38.62 0.71 
SILS IQ 
Estimate 
114.34 5.62 - 
EBI-SK 2.83 0.66 - 
EBI-CK 2.69 0.81 - 
EBI-IA 3.46 0.78 - 
EBI-OA 3.29 0.75 - 
EBI-QL 2.17 0.59 - 
GDMS-R 4.06 0.53 - 
GDMS-I 3.58 0.76 - 
GDMS-D 3.39 0.81 - 
GDMS-A 2.72 1.04 - 
GDMS-S 2.71 0.84 - 
EUA-A 1.23 1.67 - 
EUA-E 7.72 4.27 - 
EUA-M 5.84 4.18 - 
Active open minded thinking scale (AOT), Cognitive Reflections test (CRT), 
Shipley Institute of Living Scale (SILS) IQ estimate, Epistemological Belief Inventory 
subscale simple knowledge mean (EBI-SK), subscale certain knowledge (EBI-CK), 
subscale innate ability (EBI-IA), subscale omniscient authority (EBI-OA), and subscale 
quick learning (EBI-OA), General decision making scale: rational (GDMS-R), intuitive 
(GDMS-I), dependent (GDMS-D), avoidant (GDMS-A), and spontaneous (GDMS-S), 
Epistemological Understanding Assessment: authoritative (EUA-A), evaluative (EUA-E), 
multiplist (EUA-M). 
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Table 2  
Correlations between regression beta weights and individual differences. 
 Researcher Perspective Participant Perspective 
Belief Beta 
 Weight 
Evidence Beta 
Weight 
Belief Beta 
Weight 
Evidence 
Beta Weight 
SILS IQ 
estimate -.138  .209+ -.027 .255
* 
AOT -.102+ .150* -.100 .117+ 
CRT -.007 .176** -.084 .221** 
EBI-SK .063+ -.177** .087 -.132* 
EBI-CK .014 .019 -.005 -.044 
EBI-IA .085 .036 .004 .059 
EBI-OA -.005 -.119+ .034 -.122+ 
EBI-QL .047 -.075 -.039 -.038 
GDMS-R -.017 .013 -.032 -.017 
GDMS-I .087 -.087 .102 -.150* 
GDMS-D .143* .006 .117+ .007 
GDMS-A .176** -.016 .079 .036 
GDMS-S .035 -.193** -.023 -.167* 
EUA-A -.022 -.060 .007 .045 
EUA-E .041 -.083 .039 -.155* 
EUA-M -.060 .101 -.065 .144* 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed). +Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). Active open 
minded thinking scale (AOT), Cognitive Reflections test (CRT), Shipley Institute of Living 
Scale (SILS) IQ estimate, Epistemological Belief Inventory subscale simple knowledge 
mean (EBI-SK), subscale certain knowledge (EBI-CK), subscale innate ability (EBI-IA), 
subscale omniscient authority (EBI-OA), and subscale quick learning (EBI-OA), General 
decision making scale: rational (GDMS-R), intuitive (GDMS-I), dependent (GDMS-D), 
avoidant (GDMS-A), and spontaneous (GDMS-S), Epistemological Understanding 
Assessment: authoritative (EUA-A), evaluative (EUA-E), multiplist (EUA-M).  
  
28 
The belief beta weight from the researcher’s perspective was positively correlated 
with EBI simple knowledge subscale, GDMS dependant subscale, GDMS avoidant 
subscale, and negatively correlated with AOT. The belief beta weight from the 
participant’s perspective was positively correlated with GDMS dependant subscale and 
with the researcher’s perspective belief beta weight. 
 The evidence beta weight from the researcher’s perspective was positively 
correlated with SILS IQ estimate, AOT, CRT, and negatively correlated with EBI simple 
knowledge subscale, EBI omniscient authority subscale, and GDMS spontaneous 
subscale. The evidence beta weight from the participant’s perspective was positively 
correlated with SILS IQ estimate, AOT, CRT, EUA multiplist and with the researcher’s 
perspective evidence beta weight. It was negatively correlated with EBI simple 
knowledge subscale, EBI omniscient authority subscale, GDMS intuitive subscale, 
GDMS spontaneous subscale, EUA evaluative. 
 The individual difference measures did correlate with the beta weights for belief 
although far more measures correlated with the beta weights for evidence. Those 
measures associated with the evidence beta weight displayed more consistent 
relationships from both perspectives compared to the belief beta weights. EBI simple 
knowledge subscale positively correlated with belief beta weight from the researcher’s 
perspective and negatively with evidence from both perspectives. 
 Those participants with high AOT scores should be more likely to use analytic 
processes and distinguish between strong and weak evidence. The AOT was positively 
correlated with the evidence beta weight from the researcher’s perspective meaning that 
high AOT individuals did use evidence more often than low scores, furthermore; it was 
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negatively correlated with belief beta weights from the participant’s perspective. Low 
AOT individuals were more likely to use beliefs from their perspective compared to the 
high AOT scorers.  
 Hypothesis three was that the individual differences tests measuring similar 
constructs should correlate with similar performance dependent variables (See Table 3). 
The general pattern of the individual difference scores was that they tended to correlate 
with the evidence beta weights most frequently. The AOT and the GDMS were the only 
measures that correlated both with belief and evidence beta weights. The EBI did not 
correlate very consistently, with only two subscales reaching significance. The EUA was 
rather incoherent, the two scores that did reach significance did not make theoretical 
sense as the evaluative epistemology was negatively related to using evidence from the 
participants perspective and we expected the opposite finding. Also, the multiplist 
epistemology should have been related to the use of belief-based reasoning and instead 
was positively related to using evidence. The measures seem to be related to the use of 
analytic processes given that the stimuli was highly contextualized within belief laden 
content they seem to index the reflective level (Stanovich, 2009).  
Looking next at the individual differences measures and the inter-scale 
correlations. The SILS IQ estimate was related to the AOT and CRT. The real standout 
scale from these findings was the AOT that was correlated with twelve scales and 
subscales. The EBI’s subscales were all inter-correlated.  While the EBI GDMS and EUA 
were all included to offer some diversity to the measures of individual difference they did 
not tend to offer anything beyond the AOT in associations with reasoning performance.  
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4. Discussion 
 The results of this study confirm that a relatively simple manipulation of perspective 
increases an individual’s propensity to engage in analytic processing. This is evidenced by the 
interaction of perspective and evidence strength, which indicated that evidence strength had the 
greatest impact from the researcher’s perspective. The effects of belief were greater from the 
participants perspective compared to the researcher's perspective. These findings extend those of 
Beatty and Thompson (2007) and Thompson, Evans and Handley (2005). It provides credible 
evidence from an entirely different task that supports the idea proposed by Thompson et al. that 
participants are more likely to accept the truth of the premise when making the decision from 
another’s perspective. The experiment validates the hypothesis that participants are sensitive to 
evidence quality such that strong evidence was far more frequently endorsed than weak 
evidence. This interpretation supports the conclusion that changing decision perspective allows 
participants to be sensitive to the available evidence. The manipulation of decision perspective 
can now be added to other known manipulations of instruction and time pressure that impact the 
engagement of analytic processing. The positive implication from this is that there is a factor that 
is external to the individual’s reasoning process that can be manipulated to increase analytic 
processing. A practical application of this finding would be instruct people to think about 
contentious issues from another perspectives perhaps a third party that is thought to be impartial. 
By attempting to adopt that impartial perspective individuals should be less biased in their 
conclusions.   
 Belief bias is a resilient effect that is challenging to reduce (Evans et al. 1994, Newstead 
et al. 1992). The regression analyses of belief indicated that the portion of the variance accounted 
for by belief was greater from the personal perspective than from the researcher's perspective. 
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While manipulating perspective did decrease belief bias measures of individual differences were 
included to explore their effects as well.  
 Reliance on evidence quality from both perspectives was related to estimated IQ among 
the 77 participants in this analysis. This was strong evidence for IQ indexing the algorithmic 
level (Stanovich, 2009). The reflective mind was one of the chief areas of investigation and it 
was here that the AOT results provide some compelling findings. A preference for active open-
minded thinking was positively associated with using evidence quality in decisions from the 
researcher’s perspective. That same active open-minded thinking preference was negatively 
associated using personal beliefs from the participant’s perspective. Of all the individual 
differences measures, the AOT results most closely resemble the theorized reflective level of 
Stanovich (2009).  
The CRT measures a form of cognitive patience and it was related to evidence quality 
from both perspectives. By these results, the CRT seems to be more closely related to analytic 
processing rather than heuristic processing which the test items would predict. The heuristically 
generated responses in this test are all consistently incorrect. It makes theoretical sense for a 
measure of cognitive patience to be related to the ability to avoid giving intuitive belief based 
responses.  
The EBI, GDMS and the EUA were all included in an effort to explore additional 
measures of individuals differences not traditionally included within reasoning research. Specific 
predictions were not made for the expected relationships of these measures to the reasoning 
outcomes. Of the five subscales of the EBI the simple knowledge and omniscient authority 
subscales had negative relationships with evidence strength from both perspectives. This is 
interpreted as individuals who most strongly agreed that “Too many theories just complicate 
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things.” and “People shouldn’t question authority.” did not rely on evidence quality conversely, 
those individuals who did not endorse a belief in the simplicity of knowledge had higher 
evidence strength beta weights. The subscales themselves were consistently inter-correlated with 
each other but given that most correlated with AOT it is not clear that they were capturing 
anything beyond that of the AOT.  
The GDMS had better performance than the EBI in that more of its subscales had 
statistical relationships with reasoning performance. An intuitive decision making style was 
negatively associated with evidence strength beta weights from the participant’s perspective. 
There was a positive relationship between dependent decision-making style and belief beta 
weights from the researcher’s perspective. Those individuals who indicated they preferred to 
consult other people when making important decisions were likely to use personal beliefs when 
making the decision on behalf of the researcher and from their own perspective. The avoidant 
subscale (i.e. I generally make important decisions at the last minute.) was positively related to 
belief beta weights from the researcher’s perspective. Participants who avoid devoting time to 
the decision making process are not likely to be examining the evidence too closely when they 
finally make that decision. This interpretation is apt for the spontaneous subscale as well where it 
was negatively related to evidence strength beta weights from both perspectives. With the 
exception of the spontaneous subscale none of the significant findings were consistent across 
perspectives. As in the case of the EBI most of the GDMS subscales correlated with AOT so it is 
not clear that these subscales are accounting for anything beyond that of the AOT.  
The EUA performed in an unexpected manner. The total number of each type of 
responses was correlated with each beta weight and the evaluative answers were negatively 
correlated with the use of evidence strength, which is completely counterintuitive. Those 
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individuals who are evaluative in their epistemological views are exactly the group to be 
expected to use the evidence in the reasoning problems. On the contrary, the total number of 
multiplist responses would be expected to correlate with the use of belief but it was positively 
related to the use of evidence strength from the researcher’s perspective. Of the measures 
included here the AOT, CRT and the Shipley institute of living scale were the most meaningful 
in their results. The GDMS, EUA and EBI were the least successful of those included measures. 
In future investigations of Dual Process theory perspective manipulations combined with 
individual differences measures like the AOT and CRT may allow for more fine-grained 
distinctions between the algorithmic mind and the reflective mind. With greater understanding 
we can investigate if this reflective mind is changeable. In the current study it was treated as if it 
were a global outlook or tendency. It would be useful to know if individuals would change their 
perceptions of themselves if certain thinking styles were rewarded in an experimental setting. 
The use of scientific reasoning problem stimuli such as these can be expanded to investigate how 
individuals interpret popular media based science reporting. These stimuli only included relevant 
information for the requested evaluation it would be of interest to explore how participants filter 
out irrelevant information. Another extension would be to examine how individuals weight 
findings in light of research sponsor identities given the increasing number of business and 
science partnerships.  
Earlier it was stated that the purpose of the current study was to investigate variables that 
underlie propensity to override a heuristic TASS response and intervene with analytic response 
in a scientific evaluation task. It was found that the manipulation of decision perspective effected 
reasoning performance in both the analyses of belief bias and for evidence quality. The results 
demonstrate that this simple manipulation of perspective increases the use of analytic processes 
35 
 
 
in reasoning performance. Individual differences in thinking style measured by the AOT and 
CRT were related to using personal beliefs and evidence quality in making conclusions in a 
scientific reasoning task. These measures of thinking disposition are suggested as indices of the 
reflective mind (Stanovich, 2009).  
5. Conclusions 
This study contributed to the investigation of the dual process theory of reasoning and the 
Reflective mind as proposed by Stanovich (2009). The use of a scientific evaluation task allowed 
for a novel manipulation of evidence quality and decision perspective. These findings add to the 
growing body of literature on decision perspective (Beatty & Thompson, 2007; Thompson 
Evans, & Handley, 2005; Greenhoot, Semb, Colombo, & Schreiber, 2004). The extensive 
inclusion of individual difference measures provided confirmation that the popular actively 
open-minded thinking scale is theoretically interesting when compared to a diverse selection of 
alterative measures.  
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